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BRAND NEW LAW!  THE NEED TO MARKET  
HEALTH CARE REFORM 
WILLIAM M. SAGE† 
The most serious problem with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (PPACA) is not its contents but its packaging.  Because it requires signifi-
cant departures from business as usual in health insurance, health care deli-
very, and health behavior, PPACA is unlikely to succeed unless Americans feel 
a shared stake in its success.  Unfortunately, the new law has been branded on-
ly by its opponents.  Neither the Obama Administration nor its congressional 
allies have effectively communicated the law’s key elements to the public.  Most 
surprisingly, the groundbreaking program of near-universal health coverage 
that PPACA creates does not have a name.  This Article explores the process of 
branding major American social legislation such as PPACA and suggests a 
strategy for improving public understanding and building loyalty.  Legal 
brand equity, like its commercial counterpart, implies a functional, emotional, 
and expressive relationship between the law and its intended beneficiaries.  Ac-
cordingly, an effective marketing strategy for PPACA entails creating consistent 
expectations regarding the law’s goals and performance, and ensuring that 
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You’ve got to 
Ac-cent-tchu-ate the positive, 
E-lim-mi-nate the negative, 
And latch on to the affirmative— 
Don’t mess with Mister In-Between! 
You’ve got to spread joy 
Up to the maximum, 
Bring gloom down to the minimum, 
Have faith, or pandemonium 
Li’ble to walk upon the scene! 
To illustrate my last remark, 
Jonah in the whale, 
Noah in the ark, 
What did they do 
Just when ev’rything looked so dark? 
“Man,” they said, 
“We’d better 
Ac-cent-tchu-ate the positive, 
E-lim-mi-nate the negative, 
And latch on 
To the affirmative, 
Don’t mess with Mister In-Between— 
No, 





1 JOHNNY MERCER, AC-CENT-TCHU-ATE THE POSITIVE (Capitol Records 1944). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Overconfidence is central to the American political psyche.  Not-
withstanding the length and complexity of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA),2 opinions as to the merits of the re-
cently enacted health reform law are as strongly held as they are wide-
ly divergent.  In a recent poll, public opinion regarding repeal of the 
law—an action newly elected Republican members of Congress have 
urged—remained polarized.3  An overwhelming majority of Republi-
can respondents favored repeal, while Democratic resistance to repeal 
was nearly as strong.4  Independent voters were divided.5  Strikingly, 
only 2-4% of surveyed voters in each party demographic declared 
themselves “not sure.”6 
Improving understanding of the new law is an obvious first step 
toward building support for it.  Indeed, the Obama Administration 
has worked hard to provide accessible information about PPACA.  
The Administration even created a comprehensive website, 
www.HealthCare.gov.7    This website connects people to new and im-
proved tools for evaluating their health and health care options, such 
as “Compare Care Quality,” a Bush Administration initiative8 that pro-
vides patients with comparative information about hospitals and phy-
sicians, including formal quality metrics.9 
 
2 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
3 See Zogby Interactive:  Majority Wants Healthcare Reform Repealed, ZOGBY INT’L ( Jan. 
18, 2011), http://www.zogby.com/news/2011/01/18/Zogby-interactive-majority-wants-
healthcare-reform-repealed (surveying voters’ views on repealing PPACA and finding 
that 54% favored repeal while 43% opposed it). 
4 See id. (noting that 94% of Republicans surveyed favored repeal while 82% of 
Democrats opposed it). 
5 See id. (showing that 54% of Independents favored repeal while 42% opposed it). 
6 Id. 
7 See HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) 
(urging Americans to “[t]ake health care into [their] own hands”). 
8 See Hospital Quality Initiative Overview, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SER-
VICES (July 2008), http://www.cms.gov/HospitalQualityInits/Downloads/Hospitaloverview. 
pdf (explaining that the program initially launched as “Hospital Compare” in April 2005 
as part of a larger “Hospital Quality Initiative” backed by the Bush Administration). 
9 Compare Care Quality, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/compare 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
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I.  BRANDING SOCIAL CHANGE 
A key piece of the health reform puzzle is still missing from this 
approach.  The American public must debate, resolve, and ultimately 
share a collective meaning of health and medical care in our society.  
Neither partisanship nor ideology need disappear.  But public under-
standing must encompass health and health care as an attribute of ci-
tizenship, not merely as a personal choice and associated expense.  
Social solidarity is not alien to our polity.  However, it is a less familiar 
construct for how we view our health care system than for how we ap-
proach such matters as the privilege of the government to tax and 
spend generally.10  Awakening ourselves to its critical importance in 
health is an essential aspect of educating the public about PPACA.11 
The Obama Administration has shown little interest in guiding 
the evolution of public opinion by creating an ongoing relationship 
between the law and the public—in other words, by imagining health 
reform as a “brand.”  Brand marketing admittedly is an unusual focus 
for legal scholarship.  Still, legislative branding is an overlooked aspect 
of social change, especially given the many features of American gov-
ernment that favor inaction in domestic policy.12 
 The Administration’s website justifies and explains PPACA in 
the following limited fashion: 
 Reforms under the Affordable Care Act brought an end to some of 
the worst abuses of the insurance industry.  These reforms have given 
Americans new rights and benefits, by helping more children get health 
coverage, ending lifetime and most annual limits on care, allowing young 
adults under 26 to stay on their parent’s [sic] health insurance, and giv-
ing patients access to recommended preventive services without cost. 
 Many other new benefits of the law have already taken effect, includ-
ing 50% discounts on brand-name drugs for seniors in the Medicare 
“donut hole,” and tax credits for small businesses that provide insurance 
 
10 See Lawrence R. Jacobs, Politics of America’s Supply State:  Health Reform and Tech-
nology, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1995, at 143, 149-52 (arguing that the American supply-
side view of health care places an affordability constraint on access, rather than having 
the need for broad access drive cost control). 
11 See William M. Sage, Solidarity:  Unfashionable, but Still American (arguing that an 
individualistic view of health care ignores the interdependent nature of the American 
health care system along political, social, and economic dimensions), in CONNECTING 
AMERICAN VALUES WITH HEALTH REFORM 10, 10-12 (Mary Crowley ed., 2009), available 
at http://www.thehastingscenter.org/Publications/Detail.aspx?id=3528. 
12 See SARAH A. BINDER, STALEMATE:  CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATIVE 
GRIDLOCK 32-33 (2003) (contending that both the structure of governmental institu-
tions under the Constitution and the outcome of elections contribute to the problem). 
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for employees.  More rights, protections and benefits for Americans are 
on the way now through 2014.
13
 
This summary is reasonably informative, but it is framed in bland 
terms (for example, “rights, protections and benefits”), offers largely 
disconnected examples, and positions PPACA mainly as a response to 
a familiar but not wholly plausible villain:  private health insurers. 
Glaringly, neither the summary of PPACA on the Administration’s 
website,14 nor the more detailed explanation of the law that the gov-
ernment has made available, confers a name on the nation’s 
groundbreaking new program of near-universal health coverage or 
fosters a connection between that program and the beliefs and beha-
viors of its intended beneficiaries. 
Basic marketing theory requires at least these additional steps.  A 
successful branding effort involves more than education.  Educating the 
public about PPACA answers the question, “What is in the law?” and 
perhaps the follow-on, “Why is it there?”  Education is indeed important 
to PPACA’s long-term success, but education alone does not respond to 
the next questions, “Why should I care?” and “What should I do?”  These 
answers are provided in the course of forming and nurturing an ongo-
ing relationship between the program and the public.  This process be-
gins with a name and continues with a marketing campaign that, if all 
goes well, strikes a resonant chord that builds into a chorus of approval 
and engagement. 
II.  LEGISLATIVE MARKETING 
Political marketing and public policy marketing have points in 
common with commercial marketing but are not identical to it.  The 
closest analogy is between marketing a product or service and mar-
keting a candidate, which substitutes the act of voting for the act of 
purchasing.  If done successfully, candidate marketing continues to 
foster loyalty to the individual’s brand and increases the likelihood of 
future votes.  Marketing a political movement is similar because the 
grassroots activities of supportive individuals and groups continually 
reinforce the marketing message (although, if unguided, they can al-
so distort that message).  Marketing improvements in apolitical social 
 
13 Affordable Care Act:  One Year Later, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare. 
gov/law/introduction (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
14 See About the Law, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/law/about/ 
index.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (highlighting points relevant to the public 
about PPACA). 
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outcomes, such as health, is harder because the desired action is a 
change in personal behavior, such as stopping smoking or increasing 
physical activity, but without an observable transaction as either an 
anchor or a metric.15 
Marketing a major social program that intertwines political and 
personal change has been done.  Margaret Thatcher’s Tory govern-
ment in Great Britain furnishes a strong example.  In the 1980s, 
Thatcher presided over the wholesale conversion of state-run industries 
to private ownership through public markets.16  A key lesson from that 
program is that privatization did not begin with ideology, although be-
liefs eventually changed along with behavior.  Another lesson is that 
successful branding is an evolutionary process, rather than something 
fully detailed in advance.  This suggests that there is still plenty of time 
for the Obama Administration and its allies to develop and refine a 
brand strategy. 
The Tories recognized that substantial ideological support for pri-
vatization could not be achieved simply by indoctrinating large swaths 
of the British public to believe in free markets and then legislating 
based on that mandate.17  Instead, broad, though certainly not univer-
sal, support for the Thatcherite agenda grew out of personal expe-
rience with purchasing shares in newly privatized companies, such as 
British Telecom.18  Through clever, nimble advertising campaigns, the 
Tories transformed privatization from an elitist academic intervention 
that threatened to pillage iconic British institutions employing mil-
lions into an exercise in populist self-interest—the ordinary citizen 
making money by doing his civic duty.  This tone was captured per-
fectly by the “Tell Sid” advertising campaign to create word-of-mouth 
support for the initial share offering in British Gas.19  Because this pol-
 
15 See W. Douglas Evans & Gerard Hastings, Public Health Branding:  Recognition, 
Promise and Delivery of Healthy Lifestyles (arguing that commercial branding techniques 
could be used by public health organizations to change public behavior but noting 
important differences in the two types of marketing), in PUBLIC HEALTH BRANDING:  
APPLYING MARKETING FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 3, 20-21 (W. Douglas Evans & Gerard Hast-
ings eds., 2008).   
16 See Nigel Allington et al., How Marketing Changed the World:  The Political Marketing of 
an Idea—A Case Study of Privatization (arguing that privatization was favorably received 
in Great Britain largely because the idea was marketed effectively), in HANDBOOK OF 
POLITICAL MARKETING 627, 627-29, 631-41 (Bruce I. Newman ed., 1999).  
17 See id. at 628-29 (explaining that the Conservative Party presented privatization as 
a revenue-generating measure, not as a consequence of a belief in smaller government). 
18 Id. at 632-33. 
19 See id. at 634-35 (finding this program so successful that it was later adopted for 
all subsequent privatization measures). 
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icy change was accompanied by an identifiable transaction—similar in 
some ways to the initial purchase of insurance through PPACA’s 
health insurance exchanges20—a commercial marketing strategy 
seemed appropriate. 
In American health care, an illustrative experience involves Med-
icaid in the 1980s and 1990s.  As longstanding state legal prohibi-
tions on selective contracting between health insurers and medical 
providers eroded, largely Republican presidential administrations 
sought innovative ways to constrain the costs of entitlement pro-
grams.  Many states received federal waivers, followed by a change in 
federal law, allowing them to enroll the majority of Medicaid benefi-
ciaries in private managed care plans.21  Medicaid coverage for children 
had also expanded significantly during the 1980s and accelerated fur-
ther with the enactment of the State Children’s Health Insurance Pro-
gram (SCHIP) in 1997.22  Unfortunately, “take-up” (enrollment) and 
retention among putative beneficiaries often lagged significantly be-
hind statutory expansions in eligibility and benefits.23 
State-based Medicaid managed care initiatives therefore at-
tempted to address simultaneously a range of issues of concern to dif-
ferent political constituencies.  Conservatives worried about waste, 
fraud, and dependency in direct government programs.  Liberals 
sought to provide poor but healthy individuals with reliable access to 
physician services through organizations that avoided the stigma often 
associated with welfare programs, and also to induce families that 
 
20 See PPACA §§ 1311–1313, 1501(a)–(b), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 18031–18033 (West 
Supp. 1B 2010) (establishing PPACA’s health exchanges); see also id. § 1501(b), 26 
U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West Supp. 1A 2010) (requiring individuals to maintain minimum 
essential health coverage). 
21 See Allen Dobson et al., The Role of Federal Waivers in the Health Policy Process, 
HEALTH AFF., Winter 1992, at 72, 87-90 (analyzing state use of federal waivers between 
1982 and 1992); John Holahan et al., Medicaid Managed Care in Thirteen States, HEALTH 
AFF., May–June 1998, at 43, 43-46 (describing expansion both before and after statuto-
ry changes to Medicaid requirements in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997). 
22 See 42 U.S.C. § 1397aa (2006) (explaining that SCHIP’s purpose is to “expand 
the provision of child health assistance to uninsured, low-income children in an effec-
tive and efficient manner”); Karl Kronebusch, Medicaid for Children:  Federal Mandates, 
Welfare Reform, and Policy Backsliding, HEALTH AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2001, at 97, 108-09 (de-
scribing the Medicaid expansions for children in the 1980s, the effect of welfare 
reform in 1994, and the enactment of SCHIP in 1997). 
23 See Benjamin D. Sommers, Why Millions of Children Eligible for Medicaid and SCHIP 
Are Uninsured:  Poor Retention Versus Poor Take-Up, 26 HEALTH AFF. w560, w560, w563 
(2007), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/5/w560.full.pdf (arguing that, in 
addition to poor take-up, poor retention is a major factor in the high number of unin-
sured children). 
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were eligible for Medicaid to stay enrolled even if, after the 1994 wel-
fare reforms, they no longer qualified for sustained cash assistance.24 
States responded by creating program brands that were both ap-
proachable to beneficiaries and attractive to nonbeneficiaries whose 
tax dollars helped to fund those programs.  Program names typically 
played to state pride and avoided suggesting that private health insur-
ers were potentially profiting from the state’s new approach to Medi-
caid.  Minnesota created “MinnesotaCare,”25 Maine chose “Dirigo-
Care,”26 Tennessee chose “TennCare,”27 and Wisconsin called its 
program “BadgerCare.”28  “MassHealth,”29 the Massachusetts formula-
tion, was carried significantly further when that state enacted universal 
health coverage in 2006.  These names communicate the importance 
of health care to each state by linking it to the state’s name or a word 
most citizens closely associate with their state.  In all these states, nam-
ing was only one part of a sustained marketing program to attract 
enrollment and preserve public support. 
III.  WHY THE SOFT SELL? 
A legitimate question with which to launch a discussion of legisla-
tive marketing and health care reform is why the Obama Administra-
tion has not been more attentive to branding PPACA.  The most likely 
explanations center on the differences between building support for 
enacting the law in the first place and for preserving and implement-
ing the law once it is already on the books. 
 
24 See Sara Rosenbaum & Kathleen A. Maloy, The Law of Unintended Consequences:  
The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act and Its Impact on 
Medicaid for Families with Children, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1446-47 (1999) (describing 
the unintended reduction in Medicaid enrollment as the result of welfare reform). 
25 MinnesotaCare, MINN. DEPARTMENT OF HUM. SERVICES, http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/ 
main/idcplg?IdcService=GET_DYNAMIC_CONVERSION&RevisionSelectionMethod=
LatestReleased&dDocName=id_006255 (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
26 Health Insurance, MAINE.GOV, http://www.maine.gov/portal/family/health_safety/ 
health_insurance.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).  DirigoCare’s name is derived from 
Maine’s state motto “Dirigo,” which means “I direct.”  See Facts About Maine, MAINE.GOV, 
http://www.maine.gov/portal/facts_history/facts.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
27 What’s New with TennCare, TN.GOV, http://www.tn.gov/tenncare (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2011). 
28 BadgerCare+, WIS. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES, http://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/ 
badgercareplus (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).  BadgerCare comes from Wisconsin’s nick-
name, the “Badger State.” 
29 MASS. OFFICE OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MassHealth, MASS.GOV, http://www. 
mass.gov/?pageID=eohhs2agencylanding&L=4&L0=Home&L1=Government&L2=Dep
artments+and+Divisions&L3=MassHealth&sid=Eeohhs2 (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
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One consideration is that the Administration was never sure dur-
ing the legislative debate who would emerge as its most valuable allies, 
and therefore was hesitant to adopt a marketing strategy that lionized 
some constituencies and vilified others.  Political issue campaigns typ-
ically associate favored positions with popular groups and disfavored 
positions with unpopular ones.  Common health reform villains for 
Democrats include insurance companies and the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, while Republicans usually target overzealous regulators and 
malpractice lawyers.  Conceivably, the Massachusetts health reform 
succeeded because each stakeholder group was offered some benefits 
and asked to make some sacrifices.30  At the national level, the Obama 
Administration learned this lesson and secured promises of support 
(or at least neutrality) from many powerful groups in exchange for in-
cluding or omitting particular provisions from the bill.  For example, 
the insurance industry expanded its market reach, pharmaceutical 
companies avoided price controls, and hospitals and physicians re-
ceived assurances of greater certainty in their reimbursement systems.  
As noted, the Administration now portrays PPACA primarily as anti-
insurance industry legislation, but that image was never developed in 
detail as the law’s branded identity before it was passed.  This is prob-
ably good, because insurance reform only partly describes PPACA’s 
contents and public policy objectives. 
Another potential explanation for the absence of branding is that, 
during legislative debate, the Administration strongly preferred to 
downplay the law’s sweeping scope and massive scale, and instead to 
portray PPACA as making only moderate adjustments to current prac-
tices.  For one, branding the law as a cohesive whole risked even greater 
public resistance to PPACA as an overreaching government program 
imposing “socialized medicine.”  Moreover, a federal brand would have 
emphasized the extent of national incursion on state authority, while 
the law as drafted bent over backwards to preserve the federalist bal-
ance by leaving the development of the critically important insurance 
exchanges to states and perhaps even localities.31  Finally, a national 
brand approach would have made it more likely that the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) would evaluate the law’s fiscal impact in a politi-
 
30 See Christie L. Hager, Massachusetts Health Reform:  A Social Compact and a Bold 
Experiment, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1313, 1313-29 (2007) (providing an insider’s summary of 
and context for the Massachusetts health reform law). 
31 See PPACA §§ 1321–1324, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 18041–18044 (West Supp. 1B 2010) 
(describing the “flexibility” PPACA grants to states in operating and enforcing health 
insurance exchanges). 
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cally devastating manner.  Specifically, unifying the trillion-plus dollars 
of existing employer-based coverage under a federal banner might have 
caused them to constitute, for accounting purposes, a massive increase 
in taxation coupled with an equally massive boost to government spend-
ing, even though the flow of funds would be substantially the same be-
fore and after PPACA goes into effect. 
A third possibility for the failure to brand is that the Obama Ad-
ministration decided that actions would speak louder than words.  In-
stead of emphasizing a name brand, it may have assumed that support 
for the law would build as the public received tangible benefits that it 
would not thereafter want to lose.  Indeed, a timeline of PPACA’s ac-
complishments and more detailed descriptions of changes that be-
came effective during the new law’s first few months of existence fea-
ture prominently on the Administration’s website.32  However, relying 
on public attachment to benefits received is risky for two reasons.  
First, the same fiscal politics that kept the insurance exchanges as va-
gue state entities required the Administration to phase in costly bene-
fits slowly, extending where possible beyond the CBO’s 10-year time 
horizon, lest the apparent price tag of the law prove politically unac-
ceptable.33  Second, although securing health coverage may be psycho-
logically attractive to some individuals, most people use little or none 
of their available insurance benefits in a given year34 and may not 
perceive immediate value in PPACA’s requirement to purchase it. 
IV.  STEP 1:  EDUCATING AMERICANS ABOUT HEALTH REFORM 
Health care is a complicated subject, and PPACA is a complex and 
imperfect law.  Consequently, few ordinary Americans understand 
what the country might gain from health care reform or lose without 
it.  Although branding means more than just conveying information 
 
32 Timeline:  What’s Changing and When, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare. 
gov/law/timeline (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
33 See Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Michael J. Ramlet, Health Care Reform Is Likely to Widen 
Federal Budget Deficits, Not Reduce Them, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1136, 1138 (2010) (noting that 
“the act front-loads revenues and back-loads spending”). 
34 According to Sherry Glied, “[T]he 50 percent of Americans with the least 
spending [on health care in 1987] accounted for only 3 percent of total health spend-
ing.  In fact, about 15 percent of Americans use no health care in any given year.”   
SHERRY GLIED, CHRONIC CONDITION:  WHY HEALTH REFORM FAILS 123 (1997).  Glied 
points out, by contrast, that “[t]he 1 percent of Americans with the highest spending 
on health care in 1987 accounted for fully 30 percent of total health spending in that 
year.”  Id.  
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in the hope that people will act on it, an effective marketing approach 
to PPACA does require a communication strategy that simplifies the 
new law’s principal features and presents them in a credible way. 
PPACA itself is surprisingly clear about its priorities.  My personal 
experience suggests that the statute’s table of contents can serve as a 
useful device for explaining PPACA to diverse audiences.35  Moreover, 
illustrating each part of the statute with a familiar visual image im-
proves both comprehension and recall.  The following discussion in-
cludes such visual cues. 
PPACA has ten titles, with the first five constituting a basic road-
map to the law.36  A core attribute of PPACA is that, arguably for the 
first time, a single federal law aspires to improve insurance, care deli-
very, and underlying health simultaneously.  Titles I and II address 
health insurance coverage.37  Title III is concerned with the “health 
care delivery system,” meaning physicians, hospitals, and other health 
care providers.38  Title IV is about healthy individuals and communi-
ties.39  Title V addresses the need for skilled workers in a reformed 
health care system.40  Title IX, “Revenue Provisions,” also bears men-
tioning, but more for its cautious approach to taxation than for its 
specific content.41 
Title I, “Quality, Affordable Care for All Americans,” replaces 
health insurance as we have known it with a system of near-universal 
shared risk.42  This first and most important part of PPACA addresses 
the problem of uninsurability, which affects millions of Americans 
who themselves or whose dependents suffer from a serious disease.  
 
35 See PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1, 24 Stat. 119, 119-30 (2010) (PPACA’s table 
of contents). 
36 See id. 
37 See id. tits. I-II, 124 Stat. at 130-353 (to be codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 25, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.) (addressing health care coverage generally in Title I, 
and public programs for health care in Title II). 
38 See id. tit. III, 124 Stat. at 353-538 (to be codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 21 and 42 U.S.C.) (seeking to improve the “quality and efficiency of health 
care,” in part through transforming the “health care delivery system”). 
39 See id. tit. IV, 124 Stat. at 538-88 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 
29 and 42 U.S.C.) (focusing on disease prevention and improvement of public health). 
40 See id. tit. V, 124 Stat. at 588-684 (to be codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.) (addressing the “health care workforce” generally). 
41 See id. tit. IX, 124 Stat. at 847-84 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 26 U.S.C.) (dealing with the revenue considerations of PPACA). 
42 See id. tit. I, 124 Stat. at 130-271 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.) (requiring all Americans to have a basic level of health insur-
ance coverage). 
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Notwithstanding such “pre-existing conditions,” PPACA not only dec-
lares these unfortunate individuals insurable, but also dictates that 
they be charged a premium only marginally higher than healthy indi-
viduals.43  Imagine that the visual correlate of Title I is a magic wand, 
symbolizing government’s power to transform.  Perhaps surprisingly, 
the law’s seemingly arbitrary declarations of insurability are likely to 
prove successful.  PPACA’s magic wand has a plausible mechanism:  
the requirement that each individual purchase health insurance.44  As 
a functional matter, PPACA’s individual mandate is less about burge-
oning federal authority than about avoiding adverse selection that 
otherwise might cripple private insurance markets if those markets 
cannot evaluate and price to risk.  Put simply, everyone can be insura-
ble because everyone must be insured. 
Title II, “Role of Public Programs,” principally expands Medicaid 
to insure individuals for whom Title I cannot make private coverage 
affordable through risk pools and tax credits.45  Imagine Title II 
represented by a $100 bill.  A majority of uninsured individuals are 
employed and healthy enough to be covered for a normal premium 
through private markets.  The problem is that low-wage workers simp-
ly cannot afford coverage.  The average cost of health insurance for a 
family of four exceeds a year’s earnings at the minimum wage.46  Title I 
provides subsidies for some of these people, but most will be served by 
Title II, which requires states to raise the income test for Medicaid to 
133% of the federal poverty level and offers states very generous fed-
eral support for broadening eligibility.47  This redistributive aspect of 
PPACA is a necessary corollary to its expansion of private coverage. 
 
43 See id. § 1331(c)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18051(c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1B 2010) 
(“Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed as allowing discrimination on the 
basis of pre-existing conditions or other health status-related factors.”); id. 
§ 1341(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18061(b)(2) (determining rules for calculating premium 
amounts for high-risk individuals). 
44 See id. § 1501(b), 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West Supp. 1A 2010) (requiring main-
tenance of minimum essential insurance coverage by all individuals). 
45 See id. tit. II, 124 Stat. at 271-353 (to be codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 25 and 42 U.S.C.) (expanding and improving the Medicaid and CHIP public 
insurance programs). 
46 See Press Release, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Family Health Premiums 
Rise 3 Percent to $13,770 in 2010, but Workers’ Share Jumps 14 Percent as Firms Shift 
Cost Burden (Sept. 2, 2010), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/090210nr.cfm 
(“‘[B]usinesses have been shifting more of the costs of health insurance to workers 
through premiums, deductibles and other cost-sharing . . . .’”). 
47 See PPACA sec. 2001(a), § 1902(a)(10)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C.A § 1396(a) (West Supp. 
1B 2010). 
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Title III, “Improving the Quality and Efficiency of Health Care,” 
seeks to increase the value of medical services by changing the incen-
tives facing health care providers and inducing improvements in their 
structure and performance.48  It is generally recognized that high-
priced medical innovations, such as advanced diagnostic and thera-
peutic technologies, and their associated physician and hospital ser-
vices, contribute significantly to persistently increasing health care 
costs.49  It is less well-known that many of these costs are unnecessary 
and result from the cottage-industry character of American medicine, 
including piecework fee-for-service payment by insurers and the orga-
nizational and financial partitioning of physicians’ services from those 
of hospitals and other industrial actors.50  In other words, the problem 
is not the technology, but how the technology is deployed.  If Title III 
were given a visual, it could be symbolized by an ordinary ballpoint 
pen, which is in many ways the world’s most expensive medical tech-
nology.  Each year, hundreds of thousands of American physicians or-
der roughly $1.5 trillion in tests, referrals, pharmaceuticals, and facili-
ty-based treatments for their patients, often with questionable 
scientific justification and little concern for price or efficiency.51  Solv-
ing the problem of the ballpoint pen requires not only a substantial 
investment in health information technology, but also a radical re-
vamping of the financial incentives and organizational assumptions 
upon which medical practice has been based for the last half-century. 
Title IV, “Prevention of Chronic Disease and Improving Public 
Health,” recognizes that our health care system will remain affordable 
 
48 See id. tit. III, 124 Stat. at 353-538 (to be codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 21 and 42 U.S.C.). 
49 See David M. Cutler & Mark McClellan, Is Technological Change in Medicine Worth It?, 
HEALTH AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2001, at 11, 11, 24 (acknowledging that “technological change 
has accounted for the bulk of medical care cost increases over time,” but concluding that 
the benefits of medical technology outweigh the costs).  Cutler and McClellan’s conclu-
sion assumes that the technologies are used when appropriate and as intended. 
50 See Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s The Prices, Stupid:  Why The United States Is So 
Different from Other Countries, HEALTH AFF., May–June 2003, at 89, 102-03 (highlighting 
the adverse consequences of aberrant prices for health services in the United States); 
Kenneth E. Thorpe & Lydia L. Ogden, The Foundation That Health Reform Lays for Im-
proved Payment, Care Coordination, and Prevention, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1183, 1183-84 (2010) 
(discussing the importance of transitioning away from fee-for-service payment). 
51 See, e.g., Elliott S. Fisher et al., Slowing the Growth of Health Care Costs—Lessons from 
Regional Variation, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 849, 850 (2009) (“The causes [for geographic 
variation in health care costs] must . . . lie in how physicians and others respond to the 
availability of technology, capital, and other resources in the context of the fee-for-
service payment system.”). 
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only if we become a healthier nation.52  Even if Title III’s delivery-
system reforms succeed in resetting both the baseline and the trajec-
tory of health care costs for each individual served, the accelerating 
national epidemic of chronic disease will rapidly erode those gains 
and quickly threaten the health care system’s financial integrity and 
sustainability.53  Fortunately, many of these costs, and the disease bur-
dens they represent, are potentially avoidable through improved 
health behaviors, such as quitting smoking, reducing caloric intake, 
and increasing physical activity.  This problem requires a multi-
pronged approach that includes individual responsibility, information 
exchange, financial incentives, community redesign, and investment 
in public and community health infrastructure.  Title IV could be 
symbolized by a box of fast-food French fries, which connotes a life-
style as well as a diet.54   
Title V, “Health Care Workforce,” begins to develop the human 
capital that will be necessary to assure access to health care for the en-
tire population.55  An image of people working together both within 
and across communities captures the essence of Title V.  PPACA’s 
large financial commitment to workforce improvement is significant 
for four reasons.  First, as quickly became apparent in Massachusetts 
after that state’s enactment of health reform, a rapid expansion of in-
surance coverage requires a parallel expansion of service capacity, es-
pecially for primary care.56  More providers are needed if bottlenecks 
 
52 See PPACA tit. IV, 124 Stat. at 538-88 (to be codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.). 
53 See, e.g., Roland Sturm, The Effects of Obesity, Smoking, and Drinking on Medical 
Problems and Costs, HEALTH AFF. Mar.–Apr. 2002, at 245, 247-49 (calculating the sub-
stantial cost effects of poor health behaviors); Darius N. Lakdawalla et al., The Health 
and Cost Consequences of Obesity Among the Future Elderly, HEALTH AFF., Sept. 26, 2005, at 
W5-R30, W5-R31 to -R38, http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/09/26/ 
hlthaff.w5.r30.full.pdf+html (explaining that obesity increases morbidity and costs but 
does not substantially reduce longevity, which consequently imposes serious financial 
burdens on the health care system). 
54 See, e.g., Marice Ashe et al., Local Venues for Change:  Legal Strategies for Healthy En-
vironments, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 138, 139 (2007) (discussing potential improvements 
to school environments, land use policy, community facilities, and retail sale of food 
with the goal of improving public health). 
55 PPACA tit. V, 124 Stat. at 588-684 (to be codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.). 
56 See Doug Trapp, Most in Massachusetts Met Individual Insurance Mandate, AMED-
NEWS.COM (June 23, 2008), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2008/06/23/gvsb0623. 
htm (“[A survey in Massachusetts] found that 6.9% of adults in families earning less 
than 300% of poverty reported in fall 2007 that they did not get needed care in the 
past year because of trouble finding an available doctor or other health professional.  
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in accessibility are to be avoided.  Second, community-based health 
care workers are likely to prioritize health in their personal behavior 
and social interactions, which helps to leverage Title IV’s investment 
in public health.  Third, health care workforce development empha-
sizes the deep connections between health and education.  People 
who are highly educated will likely be healthier,57 and healthier 
people will be more likely to continue their education.  Fourth, even a 
markedly more efficient health care delivery system will be a continu-
ing source of skilled employment opportunities, especially during 
economic downturns, and individuals and families who are working 
and prospering are likely to be healthier as well.58 
V.  STEP 2:  NAMING THE NEW NATIONAL PROGRAM  
OF NEAR-UNIVERSAL COVERAGE 
After basic education, naming is the next step in designing a mar-
keting strategy for health reform.  In recent decades, American legisla-
tors—far more than, say, their British counterparts—have labeled their 
output with catchy acronyms or adopted bill titles that resonate      
emotionally with voters.59  These include No Child Left Behind 
(NCLB),60 Megan’s Law,61 the James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Com-
pensation Act,62 and the USA PATRIOT ACT.63  In the early 1990s, 
 
That is up from 4.1% in fall 2006.  For all adults, that percentage increased from 3.5% 
in fall 2006 to 4.8% in fall 2007.”). 
57 See ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. COMM’N TO BUILD A HEALTHIER AM., 
REACHING AMERICA’S HEALTH POTENTIAL:  A STATE-BY-STATE LOOK AT ADULT HEALTH 
3 (2009), available at http://www.commissiononhealth.org/Documents/AdultHealth 
ChartbookFullReport.pdf (“Compared with the most-educated adults . . . the least-
educated adults . . . were more likely—more than three times as likely, in some states—
to be in less than very good health.”). 
58 For a thorough discussion of the multifaceted relationship between health and 
economic success, see Angus Deaton, Policy Implications of the Gradient of Health and 
Wealth, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2002, at 13. 
59 See Jess Bravin, Congress Finds, in Passing Bills, That Names Can Never Hurt You, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2011, at A1 (describing how ulterior motives may factor into the 
naming of congressional bills). 
60 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
61 Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Regis-
tration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006). 
62 H.R. 847, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted). 
63 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 
49, and 50 U.S.C.). 
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Rhode Island Senator John Chafee announced that he was introducing 
a health reform bill called the HEART Act:  “Asked by a reporter what 
HEART stood for, Chafee said he would figure it out later; the impor-
tant thing was getting people to start using the warm-and-fuzzy 
acronym.”64 
This trend has pros and cons.  No Child Left Behind shows the 
power of naming,65 but also illustrates the danger of a program falling 
short of its lofty, evocative title.66  Megan’s Law and the James Zadroga 
9/11 Health Compensation Act associate laws with identified people, 
framing the policies they contain as both tributes to and lessons 
learned from lives that had been lost.  However, ethical and factual is-
sues can arise when a person’s name is assigned to legislation.67  The 
USA PATRIOT Act offers a different moral for legislative marketers.  
There can be little doubt that Congress chose an acronym that would 
evoke American patriotism immediately following the events of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, as well as suggest that the law’s critics were unpatriot-
ic or were failing to support American troops overseas.68  Over time, 
the name “Patriot Act” became a shorthand “symbol for all of the do-
mestic anti-terrorist law enforcement actions.”69  In his recent memoir, 
former President George W. Bush described his discomfort with the 
 
64 Marilyn Werber Serafini, Rebranding ‘Obamacare,’ KAISER HEALTH NEWS ( Jan. 3, 
2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2010/December/27/rebranding-obamacare. 
aspx?p=1. 
65 See Coulter M. Bump, Comment, Reviving the Coercion Test:  A Proposal to Prevent 
Federal Conditional Spending That Leaves Children Behind, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 521, 552-56 
(2005) (arguing that many states and school districts were coerced into adopting 
NCLB by a naïve public that was fooled by the Act’s name). 
66 See Susan L. DeJarnatt, The Philadelphia Story:  The Rhetoric of School Reform, 72 
UMKC L. REV. 949, 1007 n.344 (2004) (characterizing NCLB’s rhetoric as cynical and 
hypocritical due to its failure to live up to its name). 
67 See, e.g., Anthony DePalma, City Says Prescription Misuse Caused Death of Detective 
Who Worked at 9/11 Site, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2007, at B3 (suggesting that Zadroga’s 
death was caused by prescription drugs and not 9/11 toxins); Raymond Hernandez, 
House Passes 9/11 Health Care Bill, N.Y. TIMES.COM CITY ROOM BLOG (Sept. 29, 2010, 
3:46 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/29/911-health-care-bill-passes 
(indicating that the name of the legislation is “deceptive” because Zadroga’s death was 
not “directly related to the 9/11 attacks”). 
68 See Josh Lederman, A Bill’s Name Is Part of the Game, MEDILL REP. CHI. ( June 8, 
2010), http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/news.aspx?id=166509 (“‘Right 
after 9/11, there was a patriotic fervor in this country,’ . . . . Media organizations all 
over were scrambling not to appear un-American or not supportive of the troops.  
‘[The Act’s name] really did allow its proponents to seize the higher ground in the 
public affairs campaign.’”). 
69 Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty and the Response to Terrorism, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 663, 
664 (2004). 
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accusations inherent in the bill’s title and his preference for its plain-
er original name, the Antiterrorism Act.70 
In contrast to these examples of legislative salesmanship, the new 
health reform law has been strikingly anonymous.  One might de-
scribe Obama health reform as the Act that dare not speak its name.  
Its full acronym, PPACA, sounds like a sputtering engine, or, as one 
news article mused, a kind of llama.71  As a result, the Administration 
informally adopted the shorter but equally non-descript “Affordable 
Care Act.”72  This was a mistake.  Despite the Administration’s reluc-
tance to connect the dots in its complex but cohesive initiative too ex-
plicitly, successful implementation of health reform requires a sense 
of social solidarity and collective progress as well as individual bene-
fit.73  It is hard for a nameless law to achieve such broad acceptance. 
At this late date, however, renaming the statute would be unpro-
ductive.  The Administration already won the battle over its enactment 
and seems to have already lost the battle over its descriptor.  Without a 
strong alternative, media outlets and opponents quickly dubbed the 
law “Obamacare.”74  Instead of emphasizing the solidarity necessary 
for the program’s success, “Obamacare” promotes the idea that health 
reform was the product of presidential overreaching and furthers the 
conservative characterization of President Obama as an egocentric 
philosopher-king.  More recently, the health reform repeal bill passed 
by the newly Republican-led House of Representatives refers to PPACA 
as the “job-killing health care law,”75 making it plain that opponents 
 
70 Bravin, supra note 59. 
71 See Serafini, supra note 64 (“Puh-pack-uh?  Is that some kind of llama?”). 
72 See, e.g., Affordable Care Act:  One Year Later, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www. 
healthcare.gov/law/introduction (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (“Reforms under the Afford-
able Care Act brought an end to some of the worst abuses of the insurance industry.” 
(emphasis added)). 
73 See Sage, supra note 11, at 10 (noting three sources of health solidarity in Amer-
icans that may help in creating a successful health care system:  mutual assistance, pa-
triotism, and coordinated investment). 
74 See, e.g., Jeff Simon, Crist, Meek Spar over Use of ‘Obamacare,’ CNN.COM POL. TICK-
ER BLOG (Oct. 19, 2010, 8:54 PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/10/19/ 
crist-meek-spar-over-use-of-obamacare (describing how in a debate between U.S. Sen-
ate candidates in Florida, Charlie Crist “railed” against “Obamacare,” and how one of 
Crist’s opponents was “shocked” by the “new lingo” Crist was using in reference to 
health reform); George Will, Searching for Obamacare’s Silver Lining, TOWNHALL.COM 
(Mar. 22, 2010), http://townhall.com/columnists/GeorgeWill/2010/03/22/searching_ 
for_obamacares_silver_lining (referring to the law as “Obamacare”). 
75 Repealing the Job-Killing Health Care Law Act, H.R. 2, 112th Cong. (2011). 
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share none of the Administration’s qualms about a forceful label (re-
gardless of either accuracy or relevance). 
What matters now is naming the program of insurance coverage 
that PPACA creates.  Medicare and Medicaid, both household names, 
were products of the blandly titled Social Security Amendments of 
1965.76  These programs, like Social Security itself in the 1930s, re-
ceived their own names almost accidentally, but well in advance of 
their enabling legislation.  The Washington Post was apparently the first 
to associate the term “social security” with the pending legislation 
proposed by the Committee on Economic Security.77  The origin of 
“Medicare” is even more obscure, with no indisputable provenance.78  
PPACA can do better.  For the sake of discussion, imagine that the 
Obama Administration and its allies decided to consolidate the many 
strands of health insurance coverage PPACA makes available using a 
single patriotic descriptor, “Americare.”79 
VI.  STEP 3:  GOING FROM NAME TO BRAND 
How might “Americare” become the cherished national brand 
that the Obama Administration hopes to establish?  A complete brand 
strategy for implementing PPACA would recognize that the law’s goals 
include purchasing behavior, personal conduct, and regard for the 
collective interest.  Specifically, in order to fulfill PPACA’s promise 
individuals must:  (1) buy health insurance; (2) demand better medi-
cal care; and (3) live healthier lives.  All of these conditions depart 
from current circumstances, and they are complicated to understand 
and difficult to achieve.  Purchasing health insurance seems the most 
straightforward, as it reflects a specific legal obligation; however, the 
variety of sources for coverage that will continue to exist make both 
 
76 Health Insurance for the Aged Act, §§ 101–111, 121, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395–1396 (2006). 
77 DENNIS W. JOHNSON, THE LAWS THAT SHAPED AMERICA:  FIFTEEN ACTS OF CON-
GRESS AND THEIR LASTING IMPACT 184-85 (2009). 
78 See PETER A. CORNING, THE EVOLUTION OF MEDICARE:  FROM IDEA TO LAW ch. 4 
n.3 (1969), available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history/corningchap4.html (ex-
plaining that “Medicare” was “coined by some unknown newspaper headline writer”). 
79 See William M. Sage, Why the Affordable Care Act Needs a Better Name:  ‘Americare’, 29 
HEALTH AFF. 1496, 1496 (2010) (arguing a name like “Americare” would foster “a 
sense of solidarity among ordinary Americans” that would help realize the legislation’s 
goals and make it more widely accepted).  Representative Fortney Stark proposed a 
Medicare-for-all system called the “AmeriCare Health Care Act” in 2007.  See H.R. 1841, 
110th Cong. § 1 (2007).  Private health care companies have also used names resem-
bling Americare. E.g., AMERICARE COMPANIES, http://www.americareny.com/07c/ 
about.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
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compliance and monitoring a challenge.  The other goals are more 
complex.  Demanding better health care is a function of provider 
supply, information, incentives (including the moral hazard implicit 
in insurance), and wishful thinking about the quality of one’s own 
care.  Living healthier goes beyond daily personal choices to encom-
pass physical environment, family and community dynamics, and the 
structure of schools and workplaces.80 
Moreover, medical patients and insurance beneficiaries are not 
the only relevant stakeholders.  For example, physicians and other 
health care industry participants will form strong views about Ameri-
care.  Unlike the typical commercial context, these individuals and 
organizations will bear an uncertain and evolving relation to the new 
federal program, sometimes acting as suppliers, other times as com-
petitors, and yet other times as self-regulatory monitors. 
A.  Elements of Brand Equity 
In marketing parlance, the value of a brand is called “brand equity.”  
Brand equity develops over time and is cultivated by close, continuous 
interaction between a branded product and its customers.81  For this 
reason, a good way for the Obama Administration to approach the 
branding of Americare is by learning directly from its constituents 
through focus groups, test markets, and other strategies familiar to 
marketing professionals. 
Brand equity in a commercial context is sometimes described as 
requiring three types of messages:  functional, emotional, and expres-
sive.82  The first is the equity associated with the function of a product 
or service.  Does it perform as expected?  Is it reliable?  Second, there 
is equity associated with the internal emotions it produces in the buy-
er.  Does the consumer feel good about using it?  How does it change 
the consumer’s self-image?  Third is the equity associated with the way 
that using the product or service enables the buyer to express favora-
ble qualities to other people and interact more productively with 
them.  Do others react positively to the buyer? 
 
80 For further discussion of living healthier lives, see Ashe et al., supra note 54, at 139. 
81 See Evans & Hastings, supra note 15, at 10-12 (using the example of Classic Coke 
and New Coke to illustrate the interaction of brand loyalty and consumer choices).  
82 See Jonathan L. Blitstein et al., What Is a Public Health Brand? (explaining three 
components of brand equity as corresponding to three types of problems consumers 
seek to resolve), in PUBLIC HEALTH BRANDING:  APPLYING MARKETING FOR SOCIAL 
CHANGE, supra note 15, at 25, 28-29.  
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The following are desirable attributes in each of these three do-
mains that an Americare brand might cultivate among the millions of 
individuals who would buy health insurance in accordance with PPACA: 
Functional messages: 
 “Americare is affordable, effective health insurance.” 
 “Having Americare improves the quality of medical care 
that I receive.” 
Emotional messages: 
 “With Americare, I am protecting myself and my family 
from financial ruin.” 
 “Americare makes me feel even prouder of my country.” 
Expressive messages: 
 “My Americare card makes me welcome wherever I choose 
to go for care.” 
 “My health care team knows me and my medical history 
better because of Americare.” 
 “With Americare, I feel closer to other people who have 
similar health concerns.” 
Once the functional, emotional, and expressive dimensions of the 
Americare brand are identified, a marketing strategy could be de-
signed to achieve several critical goals that characterize most success-
ful commercial brands.  These objectives include awareness, loyalty, 
perceived quality, and positive associations.83 
B.  Awareness 
Building brand awareness for Americare is relatively straightfor-
ward.  Each insurance product offered to Americans pursuant to 
PPACA’s requirements could be identified using the national brand 
name.  For example, private health plans offered through health in-
surance exchanges could be sold as “Americare–-Blue Cross” or 
“Americare–-United Healthcare,” while public plans could be deno-
minated “Americare–-Medicare” or “Americare–-Federal Employees.”84  
 
83 DAVID A. AAKER, BUILDING STRONG BRANDS 7-8 (1996).  
84 The Massachusetts health reform program operates along similar lines.  Mass-
Health consists of eight programs funded by state and federal funds:  (1) MassHealth 
Standard (Medicaid/SCHIP equivalent); (2) MassHealth Limited (noncitizen cover-
age); (3) CommonHealth (disabled children and high-earning, disabled adults); (4) 
MassHealth Family Assistance (CHIP and HIV-positive people); (5) MassHealth Buy-In 
(premium assistance); (6) MassHealth Basic (chronically unemployed); (7) Mass-
Health Essential (unemployed not covered by Basic); and (8) MassHealth Prenatal.  
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Over time, it would be important for Americare to be thought of as an 
independent aspect of American citizenship rather than as a govern-
ment program.  The oft-told, likely apocryphal story about senior citi-
zens protesting to keep the government out of Medicare, which resur-
faced again during the debate over PPACA,85 contains an important 
grain of truth.  After forty-five years of focused benefits for the elderly, 
brand awareness of Medicare is so strong that it exists in beneficiaries’ 
hearts and minds apart from the governmental institutions that 
enacted the program and that continue to control it. 
C.  Loyalty 
Developing brand loyalty for Americare entails a reversal of the 
marketing strategies currently employed by PPACA’s opponents.  Crit-
ics of health care reform are careful to describe PPACA as an alien 
presence in American society, challenging its constitutionality (and 
sometimes the constitutional legitimacy of the president who created 
it), linking it to polarizing figures (President Obama, former Speaker 
Pelosi, Democrats, liberals), and identifying it as a burden to the ma-
jority of Americans but a benefit mainly to socially and politically mar-
ginalized groups.86  
Messaging to build loyalty therefore should take the opposite ap-
proach.  Ownership of an Americare policy should mean an owner-
ship stake in America and belief in its ideals as a nation.  Americare 
should be portrayed as beneficial across the political spectrum, even 
to its harshest critics.  Most importantly, every individual should be 
 
Applicants and Members Under Age 65 and Families, MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/?pageID= 
eohhs2subtopic&L=5&L0=Home&L1=Consumer&L2=Insurance+(including+MassHeal
th)&L3=MassHealth+Coverage+Types&L4=Applicants+and+Members+Under+Age+65+
and+Families&sid=Eeohhs2.  An applicant need only complete an online form to     
determine his eligibility for any of these policies.  See Medical Benefit Request (MBR), 
MASSHEALTH, available at http://www.mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/masshealth/appforms/ 
mbr.pdf. 
85 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Why Americans Hate Single-Payer Insurance, THE CON-
SCIENCE OF A LIBERAL, N.Y.TIMES.COM BLOG ( July 28, 2009, 11:45 AM), http:// 
krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/28/why-americans-hate-single-payer-insurance 
(recounting the story of a man who told a U.S. congressman at a town-hall meeting to 
“keep your government hands off my Medicare”). 
86 See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, Health Care Reform—What Went Wrong on the Way to the 
Courthouse, 364 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 295, 296-97 (2011) (examining legal challenges to 
PPACA’s constitutionality); Theda Skocpol, The Political Challenges That May Undermine 
Health Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1288, 1290-91 (2010) (discussing the redistributive ef-
fects of PPACA and predicting that those with entrenched interests will wage a vigor-
ous campaign to minimize redistribution to the less well off). 
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asked to think of PPACA’s health insurance expansion as “my Ameri-
care,” never “their program” or “that program.”  Ultimately, Ameri-
care might come to be seen as a shared treasure—participation in and 
allegiance to which is a comfortable act of minor patriotism.  This is 
how citizens of many other countries, including the United Kingdom 
and Canada, tend to view their universal health care systems.87 
D.  Perceived Quality 
For PPACA to succeed, the perceived quality of Americare cover-
age, and by extension mainstream American health care, must be high.  
Critics of PPACA have been quick to tarnish the law with images of 
government intrusion into the doctor-patient relationship.  These op-
ponents aim to trigger consumers’ recall of the worst excesses of 1990s 
managed care,88 as well as raise a new specter—the “nanny state”—that 
would violate privacy and undercut personal freedom in the name of 
public health.  Sarah Palin followed this strategy with her attacks on 
PPACA, especially her allegations about government “death panels.”89 
She also brought cookie trays to a school in order to portray public 
health efforts such as First Lady Michelle Obama’s anti-obesity initia-
tive as elitist propaganda.90 
A more measured set of criticisms suggests that government cost-
cutting and controls will harm quality by sapping the motivation of 
American physicians and eroding the innovative capacity of the 
pharmaceutical, medical device, and biotechnology industries.91  Be-
 
87 See DANIEL CALLAHAN & ANGELA A. WASUNNA, MEDICINE AND THE MARKET:  EQ-
UITY V. CHOICE 52-53, 93-95 (2006) (explaining Canada’s reluctance to adopt market 
strategies in health care because market competition might threaten “the idea of 
community and solidarity in the provision of welfare for its citizens” and noting the 
popularity of the National Health Service in the United Kingdom). 
88 See Jim Rutenberg & Jackie Calmes, Getting to the Source of the “Death Panel” Rumor, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2009, at A1 (linking conservative criticism of government “death 
panels” that would purportedly be created by enacting proposed health care reform to 
similar conservative attacks against Clinton’s health care reform efforts in the 1990s). 
89 See id. (mentioning Palin’s use of term “death panels” in reference to proposed 
health care reform). 
90 See Andy Barr, Sarah Palin Brings Cookies, Hits ‘Nanny State,’ POLITICO (Nov. 10, 
2010, 9:55 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1110/44936.html (describing 
Palin’s use of cookies to portray a proposed sweets ban in Pennsylvania public schools 
as the “nanny state run amok”). 
91 See, e.g., John E. Calfee, Stop Taking R&D for Granted, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. FOR 
PUB. POL’Y RES. (Dec. 24, 2009), http://www.aei.org/article/101468 (critiquing health 
reform proposals that constrain, rather than foster, research and development within 
the pharmaceutical industry). 
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cause, as noted above, any insurance program has many contributors 
but relatively few claimants, it will be hard to disprove these accusa-
tions from personal experience.92  Similarly, it will be hard to refute 
the occasional horror stories that opponents will attribute to PPACA, 
while simultaneously ignoring millions of successful care encounters.  
Moreover, some of these concerns will materialize over a long period 
of time, if at all, and are therefore as much a matter of belief as of 
empirically supportable prediction. 
Cost may also become a marketing challenge, even if growth in 
overall health expenditures slows.  Prohibiting medical underwriting 
and limiting variability in premiums by age implies that many healthy 
Americans are likely to pay somewhat more for coverage so that a 
smaller number of unhealthy Americans can pay substantially less.  
Redistribution is a much harder sell than direct personal savings. 
Brand messaging therefore should seek to instill a direct sense of 
the health system’s superior quality, emphasizing both its continued de-
votion to traditional compassionate values and its futuristic capabilities 
(including advances in information technology).  A quality-oriented 
marketing campaign should not only tout the results of formal quality 
metrics, an essential but underdeveloped aspect of health system man-
agement, but should also appeal to the public’s seemingly boundless 
appetite for compelling narrative (a frequently misleading but very 
familiar mechanism for evaluating medical care).  For example, a 
word-of-mouth campaign analogous to the Thatcherites’ “Tell Sid” 
strategy might well prove effective.  The campaign would ask people 
to share with their friends some good experience they had with care 
received under the new program.93  Quality attributes that are likely to 
prove important to this campaign include:  ready access to both rou-
tine and specialized services, a chance to receive care from the “best” 
physicians and hospitals in the community, pride in the health care 
system’s lifesaving capacity, transparent processes for making coverage 
and care decisions without rationing, and the presence of state-of-the-
art technology during each patient-provider encounter. 
 
92 See supra Part III. 
93 See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text (describing the Thatcher Administra-
tion’s use of marketing strategies to recast privatization as a part of a national civic duty). 
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E.  Associations 
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is not difficult to identify the 
sorts of positive associations that PPACA’s marketers should attempt 
to create in the minds of health-coverage purchasers and medical-care 
users.  Nor is it difficult to determine which negative associations they 
must overcome.  The following provides a rough guide: 
“Accentuating the positive” 94: 
 Affordable 
 Safe and secure 
 Private 
 Independent 
 Open to choice 
 Easily available and convenient 
 Technologically advanced 
“Eliminating the negative” 95: 
 Nosy and “Big Brother”-like 
 Bureaucratic and impersonal 
 Wasteful and expensive (for insurance) 
 Cut-rate and rationed (for medical care) 
 Untrustworthy because controlled by profit-oriented special 
interests 
F.  Protecting the Brand 
Needless to say, messaging alone has little chance of accomplishing 
these extensive and complicated tasks, no matter how lavish the adver-
tising budget, how diverse the media strategies, or how persuasive the 
spokespersons.  The products and services delivered through Ameri-
care must also perform as promised.  In other words, “latch[ing] on to 
the affirmative”96 is essential to protecting any brand that the Obama 
Administration succeeds in establishing. 
In the course of implementing PPACA, the Obama Administration 
must set consistent expectations for the phase-in of major statutory ele-
ments, and it must meet those expectations in terms of both timing and 
performance.  For example, there is a long gap between PPACA’s date 
 
94 MERCER, supra note 1. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
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of passage and the effective date of both the coverage mandate and its 
associated restrictions on medical underwriting.  This gap will make it 
necessary for the Administration to shelter those covered by the law 
from serious adversity—both medical and financial—during the transi-
tion.  PPACA’s temporary high-risk pools, which help sicker individuals 
find health insurance before the law’s universal coverage mandate takes 
full effect, therefore constitute essential brand protection.  Conversely, 
the Administration will have to be cautious about sweeping every health-
related program or intervention under the PPACA tent.  Doing so may 
sometimes gain temporary goodwill for the newly associated program; 
however, it risks diluting the Americare brand and draining the insur-
ance expansion process of much-needed collective commitment. 
Setting up state insurance exchanges and managing initial 
enrollment in health plans meeting PPACA’s requirements in 2014 
will be the critical test of the Americare brand.  It may be desirable to 
build public excitement in advance of the formal launch, but it is 
equally important to avoid widespread apprehension or dread.  The 
enrollment process therefore will need a consistent branded message, 
clarity and accessibility of information, and sufficient resources for 
providing direct customer support.  Most importantly, the choices 
among health plans that people currently expect must in fact mate-
rialize.  On a smaller scale, many of these issues were anticipated and 
addressed in connection with the launch of Medicare Part D prescrip-
tion drug plans three years after the enactment of the Medicare Mod-
ernization Act97 in 2003.98 
Finally, protecting the Americare brand means that insurance of-
fered through the new exchanges must perform as promised.  Cover-
age must be reliable and renewable, avoiding the annual in-and-out-of-
the-market behavior of many HMOs that has long plagued the Part C 
managed care program for Medicare beneficiaries.99  Health care pro-
 
97 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, 
§ 101(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1395w (2006). 
98 See Patricia Neuman & Juliette Cubanski, Medicare Part D Update—Lessons Learned 
and Unfinished Business, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 406, 406-11 (2009) (assessing Medicare’s 
prescription drug program after three years and finding it to be generally successful).  
But see Jerry Avorn, Part “D” for “Defective”—The Medicare Drug-Benefit Chaos, 354 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1339, 1339-41 (2006) (describing initial problems with the Medicare 
Part D program). 
99 See Robert A. Berenson & Bryan E. Dowd, Medicare Advantage Plans at a Cros-
sroads—Yet Again, 28 HEALTH AFF. w29, w32 (2008), http://content.healthaffairs.org/ 
content/28/1/w29.full.pdf+html (acknowledging the drop in private plan participa-
tion in Medicare under the Medicare+Choice plan). 
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viders and referral services must be easily available.  There should be 
no nasty financial surprises for families that expected generous cover-
age.  Information must be readily accessible through familiar phone 
and web-based technologies.  Finally, the health care workforce, in-
cluding physicians, should appear happy to discharge their responsi-
bilities under PPACA.  Front-line health care providers are the key 
ambassadors for Americare and should not feel the need to disparage 
the program or undercut beneficiaries’ high expectations.100 
CONCLUSION 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act fought an uphill 
battle to gain passage and now faces an equally difficult struggle for 
successful implementation.  There are enormously challenging sub-
stantive tasks associated with making this massive and complicated 
federal law function effectively.  At the same time, developing and sus-
taining support for the new law will require a much more advanced 
marketing approach than has yet been taken by the Obama Adminis-
tration.  Three critical steps are urgently needed:  explaining the law 
in more intuitive terms, naming the new program of near-universal 
coverage the law creates, and building brand equity through an ongo-




100 A cautionary anecdote illustrates what to avoid.  Years ago, David Letterman  
opened his late-night show by chatting with two United Airlines flight attendants who 
were in the studio audience.  Asked how they really felt about passengers, one flight 
attendant blurted out “Passengers are the enemy!”  For the rest of the show, the host 
periodically stopped his normal activities to intone, in mock advertising fashion, 
“United Airlines—where passengers are the enemy!”  Thomas Swick, Forward to the Past, 
S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 27, 1998, at 1, available at 1998 WLNR 6847378. 
